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EXTRADITION-INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE UNITED
STATES NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ABDUCTION ABROAD IS NOT A
LAWFUL ALTERNATIVE TO EXTRADITION. United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991)
I. FACTS
In January of 1986, Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez ("Verdugo"),
a citizen and resident of Mexico, was seized by Mexican police officers
in his home country. He was handcuffed, blindfolded and placed
face down in the back seat of an automobile for a two hour drive
to the United States border.' At the border, the Mexican police officers
pushed him through a hole in the fence separating the two countries
and taken into custody by waiting United States marshals possessing
a warrant for his arrest for various charges related to drug trafficking. 2
In response to Verdugo's apprehension, the Mexican government
lodged a formal complaint3 with the United States State Department.
In addition to denying all charges, Verdugo sought to have the
case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that the
manner in which he was apprehended violated the extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico.4 Following a two month jury
trial, he was convicted in district court of five felonies related to the
kidnapping and murder of United States Drug Enforcement ("DEA")
I United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990)(Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search by United
States authorities of the Mexican residence of a Mexican citizen who had no voluntary
attachment to the United States).
I U.S.-Backed Kidnappings Ruled Illegal, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1991, § A, at 1,
col. 2 (home ed.).
I Mexico did not specifically ask for Verdugo's repatriation. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 Article 10 of the extradition treaty in place at the time of Verdugo's abduction
states that a party must be extradited through diplomatic channels. Extradition
Treaty, Jan. 25, 1980, United States-Mexico, art. 10, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5066 [hereinafter
"Extradition Treaty"]. The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, which initially heard Verdugo's case, determined that his claim of a
violation of the extradition treaty was irrelevant to the court's jurisdiction, citing
the Ker-Frisbie rule, see infra note 7, and did not make a determination as to
whether the extradition treaty was breached. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1343. See infra
note 8 and accompanying text.
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Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar' and sentenced to four
consecutive 60-year sentences.,6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a departure
from the longstanding Ker-Frisbie rule, 7 remanded Verdugo's case
back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if
the United States authorized his removal without the consent of the
Mexican government." Held, where an extradition treaty exists and
the United States fails to receive consent from the foreign government,
a United States sponsored abduction of an individual from that
foreign country in order to face charges in the United States violates
the extradition treaty; in addition, if the abduction violates the ex-
tradition treaty, and the foreign government formally protests the
abduction, 9 a United States court does not have jurisdiction over the
individual and must grant an order of repatriation. 0 United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
In 1985, Camarena was abducted in Guadalajara, Mexico, while walking down
a street to meet his wife for lunch. He was tortured for thirty hours before being
killed. In response to the brutality of the murder, the DEA initiated "Operation
Leyenda" which established a task force for the purpose of apprehending those
persons responsible for Camarena's kidnapping, torture, and murder. The "Operation
Leyenda" task force arranged for Verdugo's capture and later paid $32,000 to the
individuals who abducted Verdugo in Mexico. Camarena Case Spotlight Shifts to
L.A. Unit's Tactics, L.A. Times, May 7, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 5 (home ed.).
6 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1343.
' The Ker-Frisbie rule is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1888), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The rule states
that a court has valid in personam jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of the
fact that he has been brought before the court by a forcible abduction from another
jurisdiction. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW &
PRACTICE, 201 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter "BAssbouNi"]. See text accompanying notes
11-20 for further discussion of the rule.
9 The letter of protest from the Mexican government after Verdugo's arrest
contended that the Mexican officers who apprehended him were hired by the DEA.
The State Department's response was that despite being paid by the DEA, the officers
had worked in cooperation with U.S. authorities as agents of the Mexican government,
and that the decision to pay the officers was not made until after Verdugo's capture.
Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1344.
9 The defendant must raise the issue of a treaty breach in a timely manner before
the trial begins, or objection to the court's jurisdiction is waived. Also, the protesting
government must be willing to accept repatriation. Id. at 1343.
,o The court considered the letters sent by the Mexican government to the U.S.
State Department to be a formal protest. A partial dissent to the court's ruling
contended that the case should be sent back to the district court to determine whether
Mexico sought Verdugo's return. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1364 (Browning, J., dis-
senting).
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II. LAW
A. Ker-Frisbie Rule
The decision in Ker v. Illinois" establishes that a forcible abduction
abroad is a viable alternative to extradition for bringing a defendant
into the United States and obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. In Ker, the Supreme Court ruled that a court had standing
to try a defendant who was abducted from Peru instead of being
extradited, stating that an extradition treaty must be invoked by a
signatory in order for a defendant to have any rights conferred by
the treaty.' 2 A defendant abducted by an individual acting outside
of the treaty would not be denied due process, due to loss of rights
granted by the extradition treaty when the treaty was never invoked.'3
The second case in which the Ker-Frisbie rule is based, Frisbie v.
Collins, 4 formed no new legal precedent, but instead reiterated the
holding of Ker that a forcible abduction does not violate due process. 5
The Ker-Frisbie rule gives a court broad latitude in maintaining
personal jurisdiction over a defendant despite the means by which
- 119 U.S. 436 (1886). In Ker, the governor of Illinois made a request to the
United States Secretary of State for the extradition of Frederick Ker, an American
citizen living in Lima, Peru. Ker was wanted in Illinois on a larceny charge. The
State Department gave proper papers requesting extradition in compliance with the
treaty with Peru to a messenger. Instead of contacting Peruvian authorities, the
messenger forcibly abducted Ker and brought him back to the United States for
trial. Ker was convicted in Illinois of embezzlement. Id. at 438-440.
" The question presented to the Court was whether the defendant was denied
due process because he was not brought before the court through the provisions of
the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru. Id. at 438.
11 See id. at 443. However, the Court added that the kidnapper was liable for
his actions, and he could be charged by Peruvian authorities for kidnapping. More-
over, the defendant could seek civil damages against his abductor for false impris-
onment. The Court stressed that the messenger who abducted Ker was acting as an
individual, not as an agent or under any authority from the United States government.
The Court did not address the situation in which a government agent had abducted
a defendant instead of following the procedures of an extradition treaty. Id. at 443-
444.
4 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
,1 "This court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker . .. that the
power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he
had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.'
... [D]ue process of law is satisfied ... after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards." Id. at 522. The facts of Frisbie did not involve
a kidnapping abroad, but a kidnapping of a man in Illinois by police officers from
Michigan. The Court was not addressing a situation involving an extradition treaty
when it reiterated the Ker rule. Id.
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he or she was brought before the court16. Many politicians and
government officials mistakenly believe the rule sanctions government
abduction of individuals from abroad for trial in a United States
court under all circumstances. 7 Other governments have also cited
the rule in an attempt to validate abductions abroad. 8 The rule,
however, only involves due process issues. 9 If the abduction is from
a country with which the United States has an extradition treaty, a
court must also determine whether any legal obligations are imposed
by the treaty.2
0
B. Extradition Treaty Interpretation
The Supreme Court has held the Ker-Frisbie rule inapplicable to
a situation where the United States government violates a treaty in
obtaining the defendant. 2' The Court's interpretation of the statement
16 The Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), stated that
law enforcement conduct which "shocks the conscience" violates due process. The
Second Circuit extended the Rochin standard to abductions abroad, holding that a
court must divest itself of jurisdiction over a person who was acquired through a
serious violation of constitutional rights, such as an overuse of force during the
defendant's apprehension. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 at 275, (2d Cir.
1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1830 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand,
398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
Jurisdictions are split on acceptance of the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie
rule. See Andrew M. Wolfenson, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects
Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 722-38
(1990).
11 During a floor debate of the United States Senate, Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania cited the Ker-Frisbie rule as a means by which the United States could
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 135 CONG. REC. § 12672-73 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1989). For a further disclosure of Senator Specter's advocacy of kidnapping abroad,
see Specter, How to Make Terrorists Think Twice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1986, §
A, at 31, col. 1.
,1 Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct., Isr. 1961), aff'd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962). In Eichmann, the jurisdiction of an Israeli court over a war
criminal kidnapped from Argentina and brought to Israel for trial was upheld based
on United States precedent established by Ker v. Illinois. 36 I.L.R. at 64-66. See
infra note 60.
'9 Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. The Ker-Frisbie rule continues to be cited by courts
as a means of maintaining jurisdiction of defendants kidnapped from another country
to face trial in the United States. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (1 1th Cir.
1987)(court cites Ker to deny petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a Canadian
citizen kidnapped in Canada by bounty hunters and brought to Florida for trial,
stressing that abductors were not acting as government agents). See also Wade A.
Buser, The Jaffe Case and the Use of International Kidnapping as an Alternative
to Extradition, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 357, 367-371 (1984).
20 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). See infra note 21.
21 Ford, 273 U.S. at 605. A treaty between the United States and Great Britain
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in the United States Constitution that "treaties . . . made under the
authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land" 22
requires a court to adhere to the rights conferred by a treaty23 entered
into by the United States.24
Additionally, a court has authority to interpret a treaty in order
to settle any disputes involving that treaty.2 When an individual's
rights as granted by a treaty are restricted in the process of bringing
that individual before a court, then that court will lack jurisdiction
over that defendant. 2
6
The rights granted to a defendant by an extradition treaty depend
on the wording of the specific treaty. 27 For example, the treaty violated
in United States v. Rauscher28 gave the defendant the right to face
trial only for the offense for which he was extradited. 29 However, a
gave the United States the right to seize British vessels beyond territorial waters to
prevent alcohol from entering the United States. The defendants, who had been
convicted for violating the National Prohibition Act, appealed, arguing they were
apprehended in violation of the treaty. The Court rejected the Solicitor General's
reliance on Ker, stating that a treaty violation affected the right of a court to hold
the defendants for trial. Id. at 606. See also John G. Kester, Some Myths of United
States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1449-55 (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23 The Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties, U.S. CONST.
art. II, §2 , subject to the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10.
24 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of
the land as an act of Congress is" subject to the judicial cognizance of the courts
of the country); See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 201.
25 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
26 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). The treaty broken in the
Rauscher case was an extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
A provision of the treaty stated that a prisoner could only be tried for the charge
indicated on the extradition indictment. Rauscher was extradited on a murder charge,
but tried and convicted for cruel and unusual punishment. Because of the treaty
violation, the Supreme Court disallowed the trial court's jurisdiction. Rauscher, 119
U.S. at 407.
Interestingly, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) was decided the same day as
Rauscher. The Ker opinion referred to the Rauscher ruling, noting that had the
defendant been brought to the United States under an extradition treaty, he probably
would have been successful in his objection to the court's jurisdiction because he
was abducted out of Peru to face larceny charges and was later convicted for
embezzlement. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
27 The list of extradition treaties the United States has entered into is given in
18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1985). The United States is a party to over 90 such treaties. Id.
119 U.S. 407 (1886). See supra note 26.
29 Id. at 430. The principle that a defendant is free from prosecution for any
offense other than that for which he was extradited is known as the "doctrine of
specialty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 477 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
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defendant does not have the right that extradition serve as the exclusive
means of bringing him from abroad into the United States and within
a court's jurisdiction.30 Thus, although an extradition treaty may exist
between the United States and another country, there are situations
in which a defendant can legally be abducted from abroad to face
trial in the United States. For example, a defendant loses standing
to claim rights granted in an extradition treaty if the other country
consents to or helps with a United States violation of the treaty
provisions .31
Because extradition treaties protect the sovereignty of a nation,
courts distinguish between the rights of a sovereign and the rights
of an abducted individual. 32 An individual is allowed only those rights
conferred by a treaty if his or her government has invoked the treaty.3 1
A court may consider a formal protest to constitute both an invocation
of the treaty and a claim that the treaty was violated. 34 An exception
to this rule is that a violation of the doctrine of specialty35 gives
either the government or the individual extradited standing to invoke
rights granted by the treaty. 36
30 United States v. Cordero, 688 F.2d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendants sent by
the Panamanian government to the United States without invocation of existing
extradition treaty did not deprive court of jurisdiction).
" United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (Thai agents delivering
defendant to DEA agents at airport indicated government acquiescence to the de-
fendant's abduction and was not a violation of the extradition treaty existing between
the countries).
32 BAssIouNI, supra note 7, at 201,
, "It is well established that individuals have no standing to challenge violations
of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereigns involved."
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990); United States ex
rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (no justification for a court to
divest itself of jurisdiction without an allegation of a government protest); See also
Martin. B. Sipple, The Wild Western Hemisphere: Due Process and Treaty Limi-
tations on the Power of United States Courts to Try Foreign Nationals Abducted
Abroad by Government Agents, 68 WASH U.L.Q. 1047, 1059-68 (1990) [hereinafter
The Wild Western Hemisphere].
In Matta, a defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction over him after he was
abducted out of Honduras. The court denied his challenge because the Honduran
government made no official protest. 896 F.2d at 260. Although the government
did not protest the abduction, individuals in Honduras did. Following the defendant's
abduction, 2000 protestors stormed the American consulate in Honduras. Five people
died in subsequent clashes with police. Camarena Case Spotlight Shifts to L.A.
Unit's Tactics, L.A. TimEs, May 7, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 5 (home ed.).
14 "Little authority exists as to what constitutes a protest by a sovereign for the
purpose of raising a treaty violation in federal court." United States v. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. 599, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (defendant abducted from Mexico ordered
returned after Mexican government asked for defendant's repatriation).
11 See supra note 29.
16 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 421 (Great Britain did not protest the treaty violation
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An extradition treaty is an agreement which under certain circum-
stances creates rights recognized in domestic courts.37 However, it is
primarily an accord between nations entered into for a specific pur-
pose. 8 Therefore, the rights granted domestically by the treaty should
not exceed the purpose intended.3 9
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,40 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that a unilateral government sponsored extra-
territorial abduction executed in order to bring a defendant to trial
in the United States is a clear violation of an existing extradition
treaty and of principles of international law. 4' The court refused to
give the abducted individual standing to protest the violation unless
the other government involved made a formal protest.4 2 The court,
however, considered a formal protest to be tantamount to a request
for repatriation.43 As a result of the ruling, the United States gov-
ernment has few alternatives other than formal extradition proceedings
in order to bring defendants abroad to trial in a United States court."
A. Narrowing of the Ker-Frisbie Rule
The court correctly distinguished the Verdugo case from those cases
in which a forcible abduction had been allowed under the Ker-Frisbie
rule.43 The facts surrounding the cases which developed the rule46 are
to the United States, but the doctrine of specialty allowed the defendant to claim
rights under the treaty).
31 The Wild Western Hemisphere, supra note 33, at 1063.
11 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 580.
39 RESTATEMENT (THiiD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 114 (Am. L. Inst. 1987).
- 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
41 "One of the most fundamental principles of international relations is the
principle that the territorial integrity of a sovereign nation may not be breached by
force." Id. at 1352; see infra note 61.
42 Id. at 1343.
43 Id. at 1360.
" The United States may avoid formal extradition proceedings if the other gov-
ernment consents to or assists in abducting the individual, or does not file a protest
after the abduction. However, in no situation can the United States abduct an
individual from a country with which it has an existing extradition treaty without
that government's approval. Id. at 1352.
41 The Ker-Frisbie rule indicates that "the power of a court to try a person for
a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction"'. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,
522 (1952). See supra note 15.
46 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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significantly different from the facts of Verdugo. In Ker, the court
stressed that the abduction which brought the defendant to trial was
carried out by a private individual acting outside any treaty agreement
the United States had entered .4 Moreover, no government protest
followed the abduction." In Verdugo, the abductors were acting at
the behest of the United States, an extradition treaty was in place,
and the abduction was protested by the Mexican government. 49
The Frisbie case concerned a domestic kidnapping from one state
by agents of another state, together with alleged violations of the
defendant's fourteenth amendment rights. °0 Verdugo, however, in-
volved a kidnapping outside the United States. The defendant argued
lack of jurisdiction due to rights conferred by an extradition treaty,5
thus making a comparison to Frisbie irrelevant. Therefore, the court
was correct in distinguishing Verdugo from Ker and its progeny.
The court in Verdugo, by clarifying the factual situation in which
the Ker-Frisbie rule applies, indicates that the United States does not
have unquestionable jurisdiction if a government-sponsored kidnap-
ping results in a protest from the nation in which the kidnapping
took place.5 2
B. Clarifying Obligations of Extradition Treaties
The defendant's appeal in Verdugo was based on a claim of loss
of rights which were guaranteed by the extradition treaty existing
between the United States and Mexico at the time the defendant was
abducted.53 Although the treaty does not contain any specific pro-
visions dealing with unilateral forcible abductions outside of the
treaty, the court accurately considered this type of activity to be an
implicit treaty violation.54 This position is supported by the Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Rauscher,55 which states that ex-
tradition treaties impose legal obligations on the United States which
,7 Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
4 Id.
49 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1343.
So Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.
51 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1344.
52 Id. at 1348.
11 Extradition Treaty, supra note 4.
54 "A kidnapping is a flagrant treaty violation because it wholly circumvents the
extradition process. . . ." Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1356.
55 Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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must be obeyed whether the obligations are expressed or implied.5 6
The United States government attempted to make the kidnapping
of Verdugo legitimate by arguing that the extradition treaty could
not grant the defendant rights because the United States chose not
to invoke the treaty to obtain the defendant. 7 Such a position ignores
the purpose"8 , pledges 9 and written language of the actual treaty.6
Additionally, this position overlooks the fact that the United States
violated Mexican sovereignty and international law by supporting the
kidnapping. 6' A similar incident involving an Israeli abduction of a
war criminal from Argentina62 led to a United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolution condemning Israel's action 63 . The government's position
that an extradition treaty can be ignored begs the fundamental ques-
56 119 U.S. at 412; see supra note 26."Nations enter into extradition treaties in
order to impose legal obligations on one another under appropriate conditions."
Id. at 412.
17 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1352.
11 The treaty specifies that the United States and Mexico desire to "cooperate
more closely against crime." Extradition Treaty, supra note 4, at 5061. However,
due to a forcible abduction similar to the type occurring in Verdugo, Mexico
threatened to cut off anti-drug cooperation with the United States for violating its
sovereignty. Extradition of DEA Agent, Informant Sought, WASH. POST, July 21,
1990, § 1, at A4 (final ed.).
19 In the treaty, the United States promised to observe and fulfill extradition
procedures in good faith. Extradition Treaty, supra note 4, at 5059.
60 Article Nine of the treaty preserves a government's right to have its citizens
prosecuted by its own authorities instead of extraditing an individual. Extradition
Treaty, supra note 4 at 5065. By abducting the defendant, the United States prevented
the Mexican government from exercising this right. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1350.
In Colombia, the right of native-born Colombians not to be extradited was made
a part of the new constitution enacted July 5, 1991. Colombia's Rewritten Charter
Opens Politics to New Forces, N.Y. Tulms, July 5, 1991, at A2, col. 3.
6' BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 191. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law
Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 Am.
J. INT'L L. 444, 472-77 (1990) (state-sponsored abduction is a violation of international
law for three reasons: 1) breach of the other nation's sovereignty, 2) loss of safeguards
provided by extradition treaty to the treaty nations and the individual, and 3) violation
of international human rights).
62 In 1961, individuals acting on the behalf of the Israeli government kidnapped
Adolf Eichmann from Argentina without the consent or knowledge of the Argentine
government. He was taken to Israel to face trial under Israeli law for crimes against
the Jewish people, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for his role in the
Jewish holocaust during World War II. He was tried, convicted, and hanged. See
P. PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN T1UAL 1-32 (1964); see also Attorney General v.
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Isr. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962).
63 15 U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.868 (1960)
(resolution declaring the abduction an invasion of Argentina's sovereignty and an
endangerment to world peace).
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tion: what is the purpose of a nation entering into a treaty if it can
be disregarded?64
The Verdugo court's position that forcible abductions are implicitly
prohibited in extradition treaties is bolstered by statements in many
international documents to which the United States is a signatory
that prohibit a nation from violating the sovereignty of another nation
with force. 65
C. Requirement of Formal Protest
Although the Ninth Circuit ruled that extradition treaties forbid
government-sponsored kidnappings, it required a formal protest by
the foreign government in order for the abducted individual to have
standing to object to a loss of rights granted by the treaty. 6 The
result of this holding is that the United States is not restricted to
using the formal extradition procedures of a treaty as the exclusive
means of obtaining individuals located in another country. However,
the holding does protect a nation's sovereignty by prohibiting the
United States from ignoring the extradition treaty without the other
nation's consent. For example, a nation may choose to consent to
an abduction by implicitly failing to protest it,67 or may agree with
the United States to cooperate outside of the treaty. 68
64 The Verdugo court strongly disagreed with the government's position that the
terms of an extradition treaty are operative only when it chooses to invoke the
treaty, stating it made "no sense whatsoever." Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1351.
65 Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations provides:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."
U.N. CHARTR art. 6, 4.
Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides:
"The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by
another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever." Charter of
the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 17, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
2420, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
607.
Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1352.
67 See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (refusing defendant standing to invoke rights in ex-
tradition treaty because Argentina did not protest his abduction).
" See United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant cannot
invoke extradition treaty if both countries agreed to work outside of it).
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The difficulty with the court's ruling that a formal protest gives
an individual standing to invoke the rights granted by the extradition
treaty is that the scope of each protest is over-interpreted to mean
that the protesting government is seeking repatriation.6 9 By protesting
the abduction, a government may be sending a message other than
that it wants the defendant returned. For instance, it may be seeking
to avoid a political crisis among its constituents, or it may be merely
attempting to receive an accounting from the United States for its
actions and may not actually want to invoke sovereign rights or have
the defendant returned. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that some
departments in a government may not be aware of what others are
doing, so that a situation could arise in which one department is
protesting an abduction while another has assisted in it.70 International
law does not require repatriation for abductions which violate national
sovereignty. 7' In an incident similar to Verdugo heard by the United
Nations Security Council, 72 the offending nation was ordered to pay
reparations but was not required to return the abducted individual.73
The Verdugo court stated that a government may withdraw a
protest, causing the defendant to lose his rights under the extradition
treaty. 74 The court, however, again failed to recognize that a formal
protest may be made for political as well as judicial reasons. In such
instances the protest cannot be withdrawn even though the government
does not want the defendant returned. The dissenting opinion in
Verdugo stated a more appropriate solution: a nation seeking re-
patriation should ask for it specifically. 75
69 The Verdugo court considered a formal protest by a country tantamount to
an invocation of the treaty, which allowed the defendant to claim individual rights
granted by the treaty. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1351. Under Article 10 of the extradition
treaty, in order to extradite an individual a government must submit a formal
extradition request through diplomatic channels. Extradition Treaty, supra note 4,
art. 10, 31 U.S.T 5066. Since the forcible abduction did not involve any formal
proceedings, the defendant's rights had been violated once the Mexican government
formally protested, requiring the court to decline jurisdiction based on the ruling
in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (where United States violation
of treaty with Great Britain disallowed a court's jurisdiction). See supra note 26.
70 The court in Verdugo remanded the case to the district court to determine if
the Mexican individuals who abducted the defendant were acting as agents of the
Mexican government or as individuals. Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1366.
71 I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1971).
72 The abduction of war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli
agents. See P. PAPADATOS, THE EIcmANN TRIAL 1-33 (1964); see supra note 62.
7 U.N. SCOR 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.868 (1960). See
also, Buser, supra note 19, at 367-371.
7 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1361.
75 Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1369 (Browning, J., dissenting).
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The facts of Verdugo demonstrate that despite a formal protest,
a country may not necessarily desire to have an individual returned.
Although the Mexican government sent two letters to the State De-
partment protesting the abduction, neither letter asked for the de-
fendant's return. 76 Also, Mexican authorities later assisted DEA agents
in searching the defendant's home in Mexico for evidence supporting
the charges which caused the defendant to be abducted originally.17
Assisting the United States in establishing a stronger case against the
defendant makes no sense if the Mexican government wanted the
defendant returned instead of brought to trial.
The Verdugo court clarified the unlawfulness of action by the
United States government in abducting an individual from a country
with which it has an existing extradition treaty, without that gov-
ernment's approval. The court restricted the exceptions to formal
extradition to a limited few. However, the court's position on the
minimal requirements needed for an individual to acquire standing
to protest the abduction overly restricts those exceptions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much confusion has surrounded the Ker-Frisbie rule and the ability
of the United States government to reach outside of its borders to
apprehend those wanted for trial within the United States. The ruling
in United-States v. Verdugo-Urquidez has eliminated the confusion.78
76 Id. at 1361.
17 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1057 (1990) (evidence
obtained from abroad admissible at trial if the defendant's constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining it).
A clear demonstration of the Mexican government seeking repatriation is found
in United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1990). After
the United States abducted a defendant from Mexico, the Mexican government sent
a letter of protest to the State Department explicitly stating it considered the kid-
napping to be a violation of the existing extradition treaty and requested the de-
fendant's return. Id. at 603.
Additionally, Mexico sought the extradition of a DEA agent to Mexico to a face
a charge of kidnapping the defendant. Arrest of Mexican Doctor Strains DEA
Reputation, WASH. POST, May 2, 1990, § 1, at A4 (final ed.). See also A. Lowenfeld,
Kidnapping By Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990).
18 On January 10, 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, (No. 91-712, Jan.
10, 1992), which was decided based on the authority of the Verdugo decision. The
Court's decision on certiorari for the Verdugo case is on hold pending the ruling
in Alvarez-Machain. Court to Decide if U.S. Can Abduct Suspects in Foreign
Countries, UPI, Jan. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
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Specifically, the Ker-Frisbie rule only states that due process is not
violated when a defendant is forcibly abducted from another juris-
diction. Further clarification is required if the United States govern-
ment abducts an individual from another country with which it has
an extradition treaty. The Verdugo decision clearly states that the
United States cannot violate the sovereignty of a nation with which
it has an extradition treaty. Violation of the treaty requires a court
to divest itself of jurisdiction. While the Ninth Circuit required the
United States to abide by its treaty obligations in reaching the Verdugo
decision, the court failed to acknowledge that in certain circumstances,
the other government involved would prefer that the United States
did not comply.
Thomas L. Horan

